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NO EXIT FROM BREXIT? 
 
Simon Susen 
 
 
Introduction 
The main purpose of  this chapter is to examine the concept of  Brexit. To  this end, the 
analysis is structured as follows. The ﬁrst part provides a shorthand deﬁnition of the concept 
of Brexit. The second part reﬂects on the historical context in which, on 23 June 2016, the 
UK referendum on European Union (EU) membership took place and which, arguably, had 
a profound impact on its outcome. The third part sheds light on the various sociological 
implications of the result of this referendum, paying speciﬁc attention to the principal reasons 
that led to the triumph of the Leave campaign over the Remain campaign. The fourth part 
offers some critical reﬂections on the legitimacy – or, as some may argue, illegitimacy – of the 
referendum’s outcome. The ﬁfth part makes some tentative remarks on the prospects of 
different Brexit scenarios – not only in relation to the UK, but also in relation to the EU in 
particular and the wider international community in general. Based on the preceding 
considerations, the chapter concludes by making a case  for a ‘critical sociology of  Brexit’. 
 
I. What Is Brexit? 
In the most general sense, the term ‘Brexit’ refers to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom 
from the European Union. It remains to be seen whether Brexit constitutes a potential or 
an actual, an abrupt or a gradual, a reversible or an irreversible process. Irrespective of the 
question of what the exact nature of Brexit turns out to be, however, there is a wide-reaching 
consensus – among both its advocates and its opponents – that its consequences are of 
major historical signiﬁcance. Of course, one may scrutinize the numerous implications of 
Brexit on different levels, particularly the following: social, political, economic, cultural, 
institutional, ideological, scientiﬁc, demographic, military, geostrategic and environmental – 
to mention only the most obvious ones. Notwithstanding the question of  what speciﬁc role 
these levels may,  or may not, play in the unfolding of a Brexit scenario, it is the conﬂuence of 
multiple factors that will determine what life in the UK outside the EU, as well as life in the EU without the 
UK as a member state, will look like. 
Brexit has been pursued by numerous individual and collective actors – most radi- 
cally by the UK Independence Party (UKIP), but also by Eurosceptics of other political 
parties, notably those of the Conservative Party. Ever since the UK joined the European 
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Economic Community (EEC) in 1973, and despite the fact that the continuation of the 
UK’s membership of the EEC was agreed to by 67 per cent of voters in the 1975 refer- 
endum1, the UK’s relationship with ‘continental Europe’ has always been fraught with 
difficulties. From  the beginning, the UK’s EU membership has been characterized by high 
levels of Euroscepticism – among its citizens in general and its political elites in particular, 
especially among those situated on the right of the political spectrum. In essence, the UK’s 
ﬁercest critics of the European project make the following argument: initially,  the UK 
committed to joining a merely economic project. As EU countries grew closer and closer 
together, however, it found itself immersed in a political project, to which – according to most 
British Eurosceptics – the UK had not signed up when it decided to become a member of  
the EEC in  1973. 
From a historical point of view, it is worth remembering that numerous treaties were 
signed (and called into force) that led to the consolidation of the EU: the Brussels Treaty 
(signed 1948, in force 1948); the Paris Treaty (signed 1951, in force 1952); the Modiﬁed 
Brussels Treaty (signed 1954, in force 1955); the Rome Treaty  (signed 1957, in force  1958); 
the Merger Treaty (signed 1965, in force 1967); the European Council Conclusion (signed 
1975); the Schengen Treaty  (signed 1985, in force 1995); the Single European Act (signed 
1986, in force 1987); the Maastricht Treaty  (signed 1992, in force 1993); the Amsterdam 
Treaty  (signed 1997, in force 1999); the Nice Treaty  (signed 2001, in force 2003); and the 
Lisbon Treaty (signed 2007, in force 2009). This gradual movement towards ‘an ever closer 
union’ of the EU’s member states constitutes a historical development of which 
Eurosceptics, not only in the UK but also in other European countries, tend to be highly  
suspicious. 
Under Article 50 of  the Lisbon Treaty,  member states have  the right to withdraw  from 
the EU at any time. Yet,  given that Article 50 has never been invoked in the past,  the details 
of the UK’s withdrawal process – if it goes ahead – are subject to a considerable degree of 
uncertainty. In principle, the time frame for withdrawing from the EU is two years from the 
date that a particular country wishing to leave – in this case, the UK 
– gives formal and official notice of this intention, although an extension may be granted 
if the negotiations turn out to take longer than expected. Thus, the immediate question 
that poses itself in this context is as follows: presupposing that it actually intends to do so, 
when will the UK trigger Article 50? It is generally assumed that new agreements between 
the EU and the UK will be negotiated in this two-year period, although the divorce pro- 
cedure may go ahead without any deﬁnite arrangements. 
The Brexit vote appears to be a historical irony,  considering that the UK applied to  join 
the EEC twice (in 1963 and in 1967, respectively) and that, on both occasions, its 
applications were vetoed by Charles de Gaulle, the then-President of France. The main 
reason for this was that the UK was perceived as largely incompatible with continental Europe, not 
least due to the former’s deep-seated hostility to any unifying project envisaged by the latter. 
After de Gaulle ceased to hold the French presidency, however, the UK’s (third) application 
for membership was successful. When, on 1 January 1973, the UK joined the EEC, British 
scepticism towards the idea of a pan-European project had far from disappeared, indicating 
that it had become a member, above  all, for economic – rather  than for political – reasons. 
As both ‘Bremainers’ and ‘Brexiteers’ will concede, this lack 
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of enthusiasm for the political, let alone the cultural, dimensions underlying the European project can be regarded as one 
of  the primary reasons for the outcome of  the 2016 UK Referendum. 
The linguistic creation ‘Brexit’ is,  evidently,  a  portmanteau  of  the words  ‘Britain’ and 
‘exit’. One may speculate whether or not further national exits from the EU – such as 
‘Grexit’ (Greece), ‘Bexit’ (Belgium), ‘Nexit’ (Netherlands), ‘Frexit’ (France) or ‘Dexit’ 
(Germany) – will follow. These are only a few potential scenarios related to what many 
interpret as the increasing unpopularity of the EU in some of its key member states. The 
voting result of the 2016 UK Referendum was as follows: 51.89 per cent voted to leave and 
48.11 per cent voted to remain. In other words, the outcome was remarkably close, adding 
to the uncertainty concerning the democratic mandate of the referendum result. It remains 
to be seen what both the short-term and the long-term consequences of the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU will be. There is no doubt, however, that Brexit – if it is 
implemented – will have a major impact on (a) the UK, (b) the EU and (c) the world. Those 
favouring Brexit tend to assume that, in the long term, the UK will be in a stronger position, 
regaining a robust sense of national sovereignty in relation to the EU in particular and the 
world in general. Those rejecting Brexit tend to believe that, in the long term, the UK will be 
in a weaker position, reduced to an increasingly marginalized player on the world stage, with 
a shrinking economy and signiﬁcantly curtailed political inﬂuence on both regional and 
global decision-making processes – the irony being, of  course, that 
all of  this has been self-inﬂicted. 
Arguably, the most controversial issue in this respect concerns the so-called ‘Four 
Freedoms’ of the European Union: (a) the free movement of goods; (b) the free movement 
of services and freedom of establishment; (c) the free movement of persons (and citizenship), including 
the free movement of workers; and (d) the free movement of capital. One thorny point of  
contention, on both sides of  the argument, is the extent to which the UK 
– after having invoked Article 50 and, eventually, withdrawn from the EU – may, or may 
not, be able to continue to enjoy these freedoms. It is widely estimated that, on average, 
45 per cent of the UK’s exports go into the European Economic Area (EEA). Thus, not- 
withstanding the exact outcome of the negotiations between the UK and the EU, access 
to the latter’s Single Market will be crucial to the former’s future prosperity. 
 
II. Historical Context 
It is vital to examine the historical context in which, on 23 June 2016, the UK referendum 
on EU membership took place, since the constitution of the former had a profound impact 
on the outcome of the latter. From a historical perspective, the Brexit vote can be explained 
in terms of ‘the conjunction of three phenomena: a world problem, a European or EU problem and 
a British (or, more properly, English and Welsh) problem’2. Let us, therefore, consider each of  
these problems.3 
 
1. 
The world problem is reﬂected in the prevalent disillusionment with and alienation from 
mainstream political parties, political leaders, political institutions and political  systems. 
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Symptomatic of this widespread disaffection and frustration with, if not hostility towards, 
what many perceive as the ‘business as usual’ of conventional political actors and struc- 
tures is the rise of populist agendas, especially of those associated with right-wing poli- 
tics. Surely, new social movements – notably those whose participants pursue progressive 
aims and objectives – have expressed a profound sense of discontent with traditional 
social and political arrangements for several decades.4 For these arrangements tend to 
contribute to reproducing and legitimizing mechanisms of domination, which, due to 
their disempowering implications for large parts of the population, leave little room for 
individual or collective forms of emancipation. Right-ring populism, however, is not 
driven by the ambition to replace representative models of democracy with deliberative 
or grass-roots modes of collective decision-making. Rather, it is motivated by the attempt 
to blame not only ‘the system’ – including the political, cultural and economic elites by 
which it is sustained – but also minority groups – such as immigrants – for social crises 
and dysfunctionalities. 
There are numerous examples illustrating this recent trend: the rise of Donald Trump 
and his victory in the 2016 US presidential election; the prominent (and almost trium- 
phant) role of the far-right (FPÖ5) candidate Norbert Hofer in the Austrian presidential 
election; the ‘mainstreamization’ of the Front National’s leader Marine Le Pen in France; 
and, last but not least, the increasing inﬂuence of UKIP, previously led by Nigel Farage, 
in Great Britain. These are only some – rather obvious – examples of a wider sociopoliti- 
cal transition towards the normalization of right-wing populism in ‘the West’. Given that 
debates on immigration played a major role in the run-up to, as well as in the outcome 
of, the 2016 UK Referendum, it is hardly surprising that right-wing anti-immigration 
rhetoric shaped the agenda of political forces advocating Brexit to a signiﬁcant, if not 
decisive, degree. 
 
2. 
The European problem is reﬂected in the prevalent disillusionment with and alienation from the 
structures, practices and actors of the EU. Certainly, this sense of dissatisfaction with the EU 
is more pronounced in some European countries than in others. As the most enthusiastic 
defenders of the EU are obliged to concede, however, it can be detected  across the entire 
continent – that is, not only in ‘weaker’ countries, which have been severely affected by the recent 
ﬁnancial crisis, neoliberal austerity programmes and high rates of unemployment as well as, 
in the Mediterranean context, the migration crisis (especially Greece; in addition: Italy, Spain, 
Portugal and – in the North Atlantic – Ireland), but also  in ‘stronger’ countries, which, despite 
facing enormous endogenous and exogenous problems, continue to be relatively stable and 
prosperous (such as France) or may even have beneﬁted from recent developments (such as 
Germany). Arguably, Euroscepticism, although being far from absent, is less pronounced in 
the ‘newcomer’ EU countries – such as Bulgaria (since 2007), Croatia (since 2013), Cyprus 
(since 2004), the Czech Republic (since 2004), 
Estonia (since 2004), Hungary (since 2004), Latvia (since 2004), Malta (since  2004), Poland 
(since 2004), Romania (since 2007), Slovakia (since 2004) and Slovenia (since 2004). Within 
these ‘newcomer’ countries, the EU tends to be perceived as a transnational 
 
157  
 
5  
 
 
 
 
project of opportunities – not least by those who have settled in the territories of other EU 
member states, but also by their citizens in general, who tend to believe that, at least in the 
long term, their country will be better off within a union of largely wealthy nations. 
Yet, across Europe, this collective sense of optimism has considerably weakened in 
recent years, especially since the global ﬁnancial crisis that peaked in 2008. One may 
argue about, and hold different opinions on, the main reasons for this fading of popular- 
ity of the EU on a large scale, but it appears that the following factors are particularly 
important: 
 
(a) the EU’s alleged incapacity to ﬁnd an adequate response to, let alone to prevent, the 
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008; 
(b) the EU’s alleged inability to deal with the recent migration crisis, combined with its 
general lack of success in controlling migration ﬂows; 
(c) the EU’s alleged failure to combat, let alone to eliminate, terrorism; 
(d) the EU’s alleged tendency towards undemocratic, out-of-touch, self-referential and 
cumbersome  bureaucratic centralism; 
(e) the EU’s alleged propensity towards undermining its member states’ national sover- 
eignty – above all, in political, judicial and territorial terms. 
 
Extreme versions of this Eurosceptic view can be found not only in public opinion,  shared 
by ordinary people ‘from below’, but also in populist statements, made by high-proﬁle 
politicians ‘from above’. Within the context of the UK referendum debate, Boris Johnson’s 
explicit and provocative comparison of the EU’s integration strategy of  an  ‘ever closer 
union’ with the expansionist politics of Napoleon and Adolf Hitler can be interpreted as an 
extreme attempt to qualify the EU’s policies as authoritarian, dictatorial and ultimately 
undemocratic. To be sure, social-scientiﬁc analysts may hold different views on whether 
Euroscepticism was generated ‘from below’ (by ordinary European citizens) and then taken 
up and reinforced ‘from above’ (by European politicians), or whether it occurred the other 
way around. There is no doubt, however,  that, over  the past decades, a toxic ideological 
climate has developed in various sectors of European society – that is, a climate that has 
made the EU increasingly unpopular,  so unpopular that it has been going through a genuine 
legitimacy crisis on a grand scale. 
 
3. 
The British problem – which may be more accurately described as the English and Welsh 
problem – is reﬂected in the pervasive reluctance of UK citizens and politicians to con- 
ceive of their EU membership as a largely positive condition, as illustrated in their ten- 
dency to embrace a deeply ambivalent attitude towards the EU. The British state’s role 
in the EU and British society’s role in Europe have always been a matter of contention, 
as expressed in the relatively even balance of opinion in the run-up to the referendum 
campaign, culminating in the narrow victory of the Leave campaign. The obvious ques- 
tion that poses itself in the wake of the referendum result is what the UK’s role in a post- 
Brexit European scenario will be. Two European countries existing within Europe but 
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outside the EU, namely Norway and Switzerland, are often mentioned in this context. 
Both of them are part of the Schengen Area and, effectively, part of the EEA: Norway is 
a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and Switzerland has numer- 
ous bilateral agreements with the EU. The UK’s withdrawal from the EU will present 
uncharted territory, in the sense that Brexit – once Article 50 has been invoked and all 
negotiations that form part of the divorce procedure have been completed – will involve 
a large-scale disentanglement from the deep structural ties it has built with, within and 
through the EU ever since it became a member. 
Arguably, the most likely scenario – although, at this stage, it is far from certain – is 
that the UK will choose to go down the EEA path, in order for it to retain its vital 
access to the European market. Even if it does not formally join the EEA, however, its 
official representatives – who, along with their EU counterparts, will be sitting at the 
Brexit negotiating table – will do everything they can to ensure that the UK preserves its 
access to the European market. This almost certainly means that, in one way or another, 
the UK will have to accept the rules of the game underlying the aforementioned ‘Four 
Freedoms’ of the EU. The irony of such a post-Brexit scenario, of course, lies in the 
fact that it illustrates that many of those who voted for the UK to leave the EU were 
systematically misled when making them believe that, in the Promised Land of a ‘truly’ 
independent UK, they could realistically expect a substantial fall in EU immigration. 
Eventually, the UK will have to choose from a range of relatively uncomfortable options, 
before being confronted with deeply painful and ultimately negative, albeit not necessar- 
ily catastrophic, outcomes. Most EU member states – in particular, France and Germany 
– will insist that, within the European market, there can be no free movement of goods, services 
and capital without the free movement of persons and workers. In other words, it is not even a 
matter of cherry picking: either ‘you are in’ or ‘you are out’, but you cannot  have it both ways. 
Thus, once the UK is no longer a member of the EU and, within a post-Brexit framework, 
chooses to accept the free movement of goods, services and capital within the EEA (and does 
so either as a member or as a non-member of the EEA), it will almost certainly have to 
accept the free movement of persons and workers too. 
Whatever the result of the Brexit negotiations turns out to be, the devil will lie in the 
detail and, undoubtedly, the detail will matter, since the ramiﬁcations are highly signiﬁcant – 
not only for the UK itself, but also for other European countries and, indeed, for the world. 
The last thing that the member states of the EU – notably its most powerful players, such 
as Germany and France – wish to trigger is a domino effect, whereby Brexit would be 
succeeded by other national exits from the EU – such as ‘Grexit’ (Greece), ‘Bexit’ (Belgium), 
‘Nexit’ (Netherlands), ‘Frexit’ (France) or ‘Dexit’ (Germany). At the moment, none of them 
may seem likely, but we must not forget that, a few years ago, not many people would have 
predicted a Brexit scenario. Time will tell what the numerous – potential and actual, short-
term and long-term, minor and major – consequences of the Brexit-related opening of the 
Pandora’s box will be. Surely, the societal effects will have different shapes and forms, while 
carrying different weight at different local, national, regional, continental and global levels. 
It seems inevitable, however, that other EU member states will not grant the UK ‘special 
treatment’, let alone endow it with a ‘special position’, given that its government called 
the referendum and its population voted to 
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leave. From the beginning of its EU membership, the UK has been perceived as, at best, 
a ‘difficult customer’ or, at worst, a ‘trouble maker’, most of whose citizens and represen- 
tatives, from the point of view of other EU members, have been hard to please within 
the family of European nations. It is no surprise, then, that even an à la carte approach 
(no Schengen, no euro, in addition to the EU deal that the then-Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, struck in February 2016 in Brussels) was not enough to satisfy the majority of 
UK voters that remaining in the EU was the most sensible option for their country. 
Another potential, but highly signiﬁcant, domino effect of  the 2016  UK Referendum is 
of domestic nature: the possible break-up of the UK, due to Scotland’s and Northern Ireland’s 
vote to remain within the EU (62 per cent and 55.8 per cent, respectively). In light of 
the outcome of the 2016 UK Referendum, Scotland is in a strong position to make a 
case for holding another referendum on independence, and calls for a reuniﬁed Ireland 
have also been on the agenda since the result has been announced (although the 
former is far more likely to occur than the latter). Even if a second referendum in 
Scotland turned out to back independence, it would be far from clear to what extent such 
a scenario would be a desirable, let alone a viable, option for Scotland for a number of 
reasons: the fall of the oil price; the question of  the currency (the pound sterling versus the 
euro); the uncertainty about EU membership (given that France, Belgium and – most 
forcefully – Spain are unlikely to back a separatist movement’s twofold ambition to gain 
independence and, once this goal has been achieved, to join the EU); the insecurity arising 
from the question about the details of Scotland’s disentanglement from the UK, consider- 
ing the former’s deep social, political, cultural, economic, military and historical ties with 
the latter. In short, even if a second referendum on Scottish independence were to be held 
and even if, this time, Scotland’s population voted for independence, it would be far from a 
done deal that this ‘stateless nation’5 would be in a sufficiently strong position to convince 
all EU member states that it should be allowed to join the club as an independent country. 
Furthermore, it remains to be seen what impact Brexit will have on the status and role 
of Northern Ireland – crucially, in terms of its border with the Republic of Ireland, which, 
if it came to Brexit, would effectively become the border between the UK and the EU. The 
reintroduction of border controls on the basis of strict police, if not military, surveillance 
systems and checkpoints seemed almost unimaginable before the referendum. After the 
referendum it represents a serious question that those in charge of putting Brexit into 
practice not only have to confront but also have to resolve. One may legitimately argue 
that the UK’s non-inclusion in the Schengen Area and non-inclusion in the euro-zone 
should make its exit from the EU slightly more straightforward than the hypothetical exit 
pursued by any of the EU countries that have signed up to Schengen and/or are 
fully ﬂedged members of  the EU’s monetary  union. 
Whatever a Brexit scenario will turn out to look like, however, it is unquestionable 
that – as even the most optimistic Brexiteers will have to concede – the implications 
and ramiﬁcations are mind-bogglingly complex: in the best-case scenario, it will involve the 
UK’s cumbersome renegotiation of its relationship with the EU, for which it will be 
forced to pay a high price, not only economically but also symbolically; in the worst-case 
scenario, it will lead to the UK’s break-up, which, long before the 2016 UK Referendum, 
had been so famously predicted by Tom  Nairn, one of  the most prominent Scottish 
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political theorists of nationalism.6 If Cameron goes down in history as the British Prime 
Minister who may be regarded as directly or indirectly responsible not only for the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU but also for the UK’s dissolution, this will be a legacy that, in 
terms of its far-reaching signiﬁcance, will be hard to trump. 
 
III. Sociological  Implications 
Let us confront the task of shedding some light on the various sociological implications  of 
the result of the 2016 UK Referendum, paying particular attention to the principal reasons 
that led to the triumph of  the Leave campaign over the Remain campaign. The  key word 
that has been, and continues to be, mentioned by both experts and laypersons commenting 
on the result of the 2016 UK Referendum – and doing so from all sides of the political 
spectrum – is divisions. Hence, the obvious question that poses itself is what kind of  divisions 
they have in  mind. 
What is striking in this respect is that especially those who are opposed to the outcome 
of the 2016 UK Referendum tend to stress that, in their judgement, the Brexit vote was, 
above all, a protest vote and, hence, primarily a vote against various issues, rather than a vote for a 
set of desired results. This interpretation is ironic insofar as Brexiteers commonly accused 
those in charge of  the Remain campaign of  relying on ‘Project Fear’  – that is,  on a collective 
endeavour embedded in a political discourse based on scaremongering and incapable of 
making a positive case for UK’s membership in the current, or in a reformed, EU. From the 
point of view of  most Brexiteers, it was not their own project  but the project of the 
Bremainers that was predominantly about making a case against, rather than a case for, a post-
referendum scenario – namely, against social, political and economic uncertainty and decline. 
The Brexiteers, in the eyes of their supporters, succeeded in making a positive case for their 
desired goal, notably ‘UK’s independence’. This bold political objective was expressed in 
various catchphrases – such as ‘Let’s take back control!’, ‘We want our country back!’, ‘Put 
Britain ﬁrst!’ and ‘This Thursday [23 June 2016] can be our country’s Independence Day’ – 
all of  which, as cynics may point out,  can be interpreted as socio-hermeneutic 
manifestations of the collective narcissism pervading crucial elements of  the 2016 UK 
Referendum debate. 
The outcome of the referendum suggests that the rhetoric of the Leave campaign was 
far more effective than that of  the Remain campaign. In the opinion of  a vast number of 
voters, the former came across as far more positive and optimistic than the latter. The 
Bremainers seemed to offer little more than a largely passive attitude, concerned with pre- 
serving the status quo in an uninspiring and pragmatic, if not technocratic, manner. The 
Brexiteers, by contrast, appeared to transmit – and, if  successful, to be able to deliver   on 
– a fundamentally active attitude, oriented towards the construction of a bright future in an 
inspirational and idealistic, if  not utopian, fashion. 
 
The ‘remain’ campaign relied heavily on trying to scare people into voting for the status quo. 
Indeed, it was foolish of the Cameron government to allow the seemingly passive term ‘remain’ 
to deﬁne the potential future of the UK in Europe rather than asserting an active goal for building 
a better future. Hardly anyone in the ‘remain’ camp presented an idealistic argument for a 
European future (Gordon Brown made an attempt).7 
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It would be erroneous, however, to overlook, let alone to deny, the negativity permeating the 
Brexit campaign: caught up in a deep sense of national nostalgia, combined with a 
romanticizing celebration of a glorious past, implicitly connected to the worldwide inﬂu- 
ence of the British Empire, the Leave campaign lacked any concrete and thought-through 
proposals for an alternative future, informed by a clear, detailed and viable game plan. 
 
The vote was grounded in nostalgia. The Brexit campaign was almost entirely negative and devoid of plans 
for an alternative future. It played on an old idea of sovereignty, old English ideas about the difference 
between the island nation and the mainland of Europe, alarm over immigrants and claims that 
the UK was somehow subsidizing Europe.8 
 
Another irony of Brexit, then, consists in the following paradox: 
 
• On the one hand, the Remain campaign – in the eyes of  many voters – lacked electoral 
appeal because it appeared largely negative, pessimistic and passive, whereas the Leave campaign – 
in the eyes of many voters – possessed electoral appeal because it appeared largely positive, 
optimistic and (pro-)active. 
• On the other hand, the Remain campaign sought to stick to a pragmatic and realistic strategy,  
referring to the ‘hard’ European reality of  which the UK was already part and obeying, 
with some exceptions due to EU concessions, the rules of the game with which it was 
already familiar, whereas the Leave campaign endorsed an obscure and unrealistic vision, 
lacking a coherent and feasible outline of what British life outside the UK would look 
like and, more importantly, how exactly it would be organized. 
 
The paradox described above is symptomatic of another signiﬁcant problem attached to the 
2016 UK Referendum: voters were confronted with a binary choice (Remain versus Leave), 
but could vote either way for very different – and, on several levels, diametrically opposed – 
reasons: 
 
• For those on the radical left, the EU is essentially a market-driven project of transnational 
capitalism, in which, under the hegemonic inﬂuence of Germany and  France,  the pursuit 
of ﬁnancial proﬁt and the free movement of capital can be guaranteed and, in fact, 
maximized. Most defenders of this position, however, tend to be willing to accept the 
historic achievements of the EU – such as its commitment to the progressive ideals of 
the Enlightenment as well as its contributions to securing peace and cooperation between  
European  political powers. 
• For those on the radical right, the EU is essentially a pan-European project, that is, an 
expression of the historic attempt to build a United Europe, which, under the hegemonic 
inﬂuence of Germany and France, is oriented towards the construction of a ‘European 
Federation’, a ‘Federal Europe’, a ‘Federal Republic of Europe’, a ‘United States of 
Europe’ or a ‘European state or superstate’ – that is, a Europe in which national 
sovereignty ceases to  exist. 
• For those on the centre-left, the EU is essentially a civilizational project shaped by 
Enlightenment ideals – ‘such as progress, tolerance, liberty, equality, solidarity, dig- 
nity, sovereignty, and autonomy’9  – and, ultimately, a political endeavour capable    of 
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providing a cosmopolitan framework in which ‘social processes of liberation, self- 
determination, and uniﬁcation’10 predominate, peace and prosperity are guaranteed, 
pluralism and multiculturalism are celebrated, while transnational cooperation and 
deliberation preponderate. 
• For those on the centre-right, the EU is essentially a pragmatic project, permitting 
European nation states to reach an unprecedented degree of social, political and 
economic stability, not only by protecting but also by fostering the free movement of 
(a) goods, (b) services, (c) persons/workers and (d) capital – all of which, by virtue of  the 
‘invisible hand’ of the European market, contribute to the enhancement of the standards 
of  life across the continent, demonstrating that the advantages and beneﬁts outweigh the 
disadvantages and costs of being a fully ﬂedged member of this organization. 
 
In light of  their largely favourable view of  the EU,  those on the centre-left and those on the 
centre-right were likely to vote in favour of Remain (Blairites, Cameronites and so on). In 
light of their largely critical view of the EU, those on the radical right were likely to vote in 
favour of Leave (Goveites, Farageites and so  on). In  light of  their deeply ambivalent view 
of the EU, the case of those on the radical left is more complicated: while many of  them 
abstained from  voting  or  simply cast a  blank  vote,  most  of them were more likely to 
vote in favour of Remain as ‘the lesser of two evils’ option (Corbynites and so  on). 
The ideological scheme outlined above is, of course, a reductive account of what is, in 
reality, a far more multifaceted picture. Even this four-dimensional simpliﬁcation of the 
motivational background against which politicians made their case and citizens cast their 
vote, however, illustrates the complexity that permeates the decision-making process of 
the 2016 UK Referendum – a degree of complexity to which, in terms of both the act 
of voting itself and the far-reaching consequences of the overall result, a binary choice 
between Remain and Leave cannot do justice. 
If, however,  it is true that, as various commentators have  argued and large numbers of 
voters have openly admitted, the Brexit vote was, to a considerable degree, a protest vote, then 
we need to ask what many, if not most, of those who voted in support of Brexit actually voted 
against. 
 
Brexit was a vote against London, globalization and multiculturalism as much as a vote against Europe.11 
Arguably, Brexit was also a vote for some version of the past. Fully 75 percent of those aged 18 to 24 
voted for a future in Europe. Sixty-one percent of those over 65, along with a majority of all 
those over 45, voted against.12 
Brexit was manifestly a vote against multiculturalism and for English nationalism.13 
The Brexit campaign wasn’t driven by arguments about costs and beneﬁts. It was driven by 
resentment, frustration and anger. It was emotional and expressive. And the grievances expressed had real 
foundations, even if the EU was a partially misplaced target and no practical solutions were offered.14 
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The main question with which we are confronted in this respect concerns the afore- 
mentioned divisions that, presumably, exist in contemporary Britain and have shaped the 
outcome of the referendum in a decisive  manner. 
In a schematic, and admittedly simplifying, fashion, these divisions can be described 
as follows: 
 
Remain: Leave: 
 
empowered disempowered 
winners losers 
wealthy poor 
employed unemployed 
highly educated poorly educated 
university-educated non-university-educated 
white or pink collar blue collar 
tertiary sector primary and secondary sectors 
young old 
18–44-year-olds 45–65-plus-year-olds 
urban rural 
Scotland/Northern Ireland England/Wales 
South-East/North-West England North-East/South-West England 
centre-left/centre-right radical right (some radical left) 
progressive conservative 
Labour/Liberals/Greens UKIP/right-wing  Conservatives 
‘Modern Conservatives’ ‘Traditional Conservatives’ 
cosmopolitan/globalist parochial/nationalist 
modern(ist) traditional(ist) 
multicultural monocultural 
outward-looking inward-looking 
non-white (Asian/black) British white British 
multilingual monolingual 
Muslim Christian 
Catholic Anglican/Protestant 
From the Remain perspective: 
prudent imprudent 
status-quo-affirmative status-quo-resentful 
risk-averse risk-taking 
From the Leave perspective: 
boring exciting 
lacklustre inspiring 
unimaginative imaginative 
From both perspectives: 
pessimistic optimistic 
optimistic pessimistic 
negative positive 
positive negative 
past-oriented future-oriented 
future-oriented past-oriented 
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For the right or the wrong reasons, these are widely considered the key divisions to which 
commentators across the board – that is, from different angles, with different emphases and 
within different explanatory frameworks  – refer in their various analyses and assessments of   the 
Brexit vote.15 Of course, one may engage in endless debates concerning both the role and  the 
signiﬁcance of  each of  these (real or alleged) divisions in British society.  Irrespective of  how one 
chooses to interpret their roots and ramiﬁcations, it is difficult to deny – regardless of one’s view 
of the relationship between the UK and the EU – that they played a pivotal role in shaping the 
outcome of  the referendum. In essence, these divisions may be classiﬁed as follows: 
 
• social divisions 
(empowered versus disempowered, winners versus  losers) 
• economic divisions 
(wealthy versus poor, employed versus unemployed) 
• educational divisions 
(highly educated versus poorly educated, university-educated versus non-university- 
educated) 
• professional divisions 
(white- or pink-collar workers versus blue-collar workers, tertiary-sector workers versus 
primary- and secondary-sector workers) 
• generational divisions 
(young versus old, 18–44-year-olds versus  45–65-plus-year-olds) 
• geographic divisions 
(urban versus rural, Scotland/Northern Ireland versus England/Wales, South-East/ 
North-West England versus North-East/South-West  England) 
• political divisions 
(centre-left/centre-right versus radical right, progressive versus conservative, Labour/ 
Liberals/Greens versus UKIP/right-wing Conservatives, ‘Modern Conservatives’ 
versus ‘Traditional Conservatives’) 
• ideological divisions 
(cosmopolitan/globalist  versus  parochial/nationalist,  modernist  versus traditionalist) 
• cultural divisions 
(multicultural versus monocultural, outward-looking versus inward-looking) 
• ethnic divisions 
(non-white British versus white British, multilingual versus monolingual) 
• religious divisions 
(Muslim versus Christian, Catholic versus Anglican/Protestant) 
• attitudinal divisions 
(Remain perspective: prudent versus imprudent, status-quo-affirmative versus status-quo- 
resentful, risk-averse versus risk-taking) 
(Leave perspective: boring versus exciting, lacklustre versus inspiring, unimaginative versus 
imaginative) 
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(Remain perspective: pessimistic versus optimistic, negative versus positive, past-oriented 
versus future-oriented) 
(Leave perspective: optimistic versus pessimistic, positive versus negative, future-oriented 
versus past-oriented) 
 
The types of division to which most commentators, notably those on the left of the political 
spectrum, tend to attribute the greatest importance are (1) social, (2) economic, (3) edu- 
cational, (4) professional, (5) generational, (6) geographic, (7) political and (8) ideological 
divisions. Surely, one needs to treat all ﬁgures used in support of this division-focused inter- 
pretation of the Brexit vote with caution, in order not to fall into the trap of relying on 
reductionist explanations as to why particular sectors of the UK population voted one way 
or another. At the same time, however, it is crucial to recognize the role that each of these 
divisions played in inﬂuencing the outcome of the referendum, insofar as they are indicative 
of the extent to which UK citizens’ attitudes towards the EU in particular and towards Europe 
in general are profoundly shaped by the positions that they occupy within British society. More 
importantly, the question that poses itself is why the Remain campaign failed (whereas the 
Leave campaign managed) to appeal to particular sectors of the population, especially to 
those who – had they been convinced not only by the beneﬁts and advantages of  staying in 
the EU,  but also by the more universal and long-term historical implications  of  continued 
UK membership – could have easily swung the result the other  way. 
It has become a cliché to compare the current situation to the historical period of 
the 1930s in continental Europe, but it is indeed worrying, and potentially disastrous, 
that progressive political forces – not only in the UK, but also in other countries – tend 
to disregard the counterintuitive truth that the marginalized, excluded, deprived, disen- 
franchised and disempowered sectors of the population do not necessarily hold opinions 
and subscribe to normative discourses, let alone cast their vote, in accordance with what 
critical sociologists – notably, those who examine the social world in Marxist, feminist, 
Bourdieusian or Chomskyan terms – would consider their real interests. The ‘like turkeys 
voting for Christmas’ idiom – although it certainly applies to the Brexit vote, because 
those who have been misled will ultimately have to pay the bill – is not sufficiently radical 
in that it misses one vital point: turkeys do not have a vote, whereas citizens – including 
the most underprivileged among them – do have a vote and, more importantly, will have 
to face the consequences of ‘Christmas’ as living, rather than dead, beings. It remains to 
be seen how lively life after (or, possibly, without) Brexit will be for them. 
 
IV. Legitimacy 
This part shall offer some critical reﬂections on the legitimacy – or, as some may argue, 
illegitimacy – of the 2016 UK Referendum’s outcome. The result of the 2016 UK 
Referendum has triggered one of the most serious political crises in Europe since the end 
of World War II. In public discourse, one of the most striking words used to describe the 
post-referendum situation in the UK is uncertainty. 
It appears, then, that the post-referendum scenario constitutes a historical context char- 
acterized by an enormous – and, in many ways, unprecedented – degree of social, political 
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and economic uncertainty. In the best-case scenario, it will lead to the temporary weakening of 
the UK’s position in Europe; in the worst-case scenario, it will result not only in the gradual 
decline of the UK’s inﬂuence on the world stage but also in its break-up. Of course, supporters 
of Scottish and Irish independence are unlikely to conceive of the UK’s shrinking to a 
binational union between England and Wales as a ‘worst-case scenario’, given that their 
formal and deﬁnitive separation from these two British ‘home nations’ is what they have been 
striving for all along. The issue of the different possible post-Brexit scenarios  put aside, an 
important question that needs to be addressed concerns the very legitimacy – or, as some 
may conclude, illegitimacy – of the 2016 UK Referendum’s outcome. In this respect, we need 
to take into account a number of key dimensions, on the basis of which the legitimacy of  
this referendum can – or, perhaps, must – be called into   question. 
 
1. 
Large proportions of the electorate were misled by the Leave campaign, whose main slogans, 
propositions and promises were based on lies, gross inaccuracies, major misrepresentations 
and populist sound  bites. 
 
2. 
The electoral choice between Remain and Leave was unjustiﬁably simplistic. The issues at 
stake – notwithstanding the question of whether or not they could be grasped by the 
average voter – were too signiﬁcant, too complex and too far-reaching to be decided in 
terms of a choice between two options. 
 
3. 
The binary electoral choice between Remain and Leave was unduly,  as well as deceptively, 
polarizing. Both in ideological and in sociological terms, the reasons why electors voted one 
way or another were sufficiently diverse to suggest that the reduction of the profound 
heterogeneity of normative positions on the EU to a polarized and polarizing choice 
between Remain and Leave was not only procedurally inadequate but also politically 
treacherous. It is simply absurd that both politicians and voters who, in many cases, held 
radically different views found themselves ‘in the same boat’ by having their opinions and voices 
reduced to one of the two options. There were far more than two sides to the argument. 
 
4. 
Referenda in the UK – especially if they are of major national and international sig- 
niﬁcance, with vast long-term consequences, not only for the home population but also for 
Europe in particular and the world in general – are consultative, rather than decisive. A striking 
feature of  the UK political system – ever since it came into existence during  the Glorious 
Revolution in 1688 – is that it prescribes that Westminster possesses sovereign 
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decision-making power.  It is the legislative force of  representative democracy embodied  in 
the UK parliament, rather than the advisory function of referenda, by virtue of which 
decisions are taken to govern the country. Whatever one makes of the UK’s political system, 
which, in many respects, is shaped by the anachronistic legacy of the late seventeenth century 
and several features of which may be interpreted as an obsolete hangover from the past, the 
country remains a representative democracy, in which sovereign power lies with, and is exercised by, 
Parliament. In other words, Parliament needs to debate, and to vote on, the result of the 
referendum. Bearing in mind the magnitude of the numerous issues that are at stake, it 
would be democratically legitimate for the Westminster Parliament to decide not to invoke 
Article 50, if the majority of its members came to the conclusion that the consequences of 
withdrawing from the EU would be too severe, if not catastrophic, not only in the short 
term but also, more importantly, in the long term. 
 
5. 
Unlike other countries (such as Switzerland) in which referenda are common practice, the 
UK does not have any clear, detailed and explicit rules and regulations about the decision- 
making power of referenda, that is, about the premises that deﬁne whether or not they are 
binding. Particularly important issues in this regard are the size of the majority vote as well 
as the distribution of the votes across different regions and the four ‘home nations’. Given 
that the overall result was extremely close (51.89 per cent in favour of  Leave  and 48.11  per 
cent in favour of Remain), and given that it was evenly split between the four ‘home nations’ 
(England and Wales  in favour  of  Leave  versus Scotland and Northern Ireland   in favour 
of Remain), it is far from obvious that the Leave campaign has a democratic mandate to go 
ahead with Brexit. If just above half a million (approximately six hundred thousand) UK 
electors had voted Remain instead of Leave,  the result would have  been  the opposite. Two 
‘home nations’ have (in the case of Scotland, resolutely and overwhelmingly) voted in favour 
of  remaining within the EU.  Dragging them, against their will, out  of the EU would not 
only be undemocratic but also, most likely, lead to the break-up of the UK. Considering the 
extensive scope of the consequences triggered by Brexit, it is difﬁcult to see how those 
engaging in the formal procedure of taking the UK out of the EU could claim to possess a 
legitimate, let alone a solid, democratic mandate. Assessing the legitimacy of the 2016 UK 
Referendum, the two key issues at stake are ‘the matter put to referendum and the actual 
procedure of holding the referendum’16: the latter was highly inappropriate for dealing with, 
let alone doing justice to, the enormity of  the   former. 
 
6. 
Constitutional democracies must have rules and regulations in place that prevent the 
misuse of referenda as mere instruments to push through normative agendas that, if they 
are implemented, have vast social, political and economic consequences – especially if 
these, at least in the medium term, are irreversible. It is no accident that, for example, 
the Federal Republic of Germany – in light of the German experience with referenda in 
the Weimar Republic (1918–1933) and, subsequently, in the consolidation of    Nazi 
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fascism (1933–1945)17 – substantially limited the decision-making power of referenda within 
its own territory (both in its pre-reuniﬁcation period, 1949–1990, and in its post- 
reuniﬁcation period, 1990–present) and practically conﬁned their role to the federal level  of 
the Länder.18 Surely, one can engage in enlightening debates on the pros and cons of 
referenda. There are strong arguments in favour of  referenda – such as their tendency     to 
spark political engagement, discussion and controversy at the grass-roots level and, thus, 
their potential contributions to the realization of radical, direct and participatory forms of  
democracy.19  Yet,  referenda are politically dangerous to the degree that they   tend to polarize 
opinion and foster the emergence of populist discourses, based on reductive rhetoric and 
catchy slogans, rather than on in-depth critical analysis. Referenda may  be suitable for case-
speciﬁc policies and/or legislative matters, although even at such an issue-focused level they 
are far from unproblematic. When electorates are asked to voice their opinion, or to make a 
judgement or a choice, on a large and complex range of interconnected societal issues by virtue of one single 
binary-choice vote, referenda are largely inappropriate as reliable instruments for democratic, 
informed and responsible decision-making processes. 
 
7. 
It is true that, as previously examined, the 2016 UK Referendum is indicative of numerous 
deep divisions that exist within British society. Of  course, one may rightly add that,   to a 
greater or lesser extent, such an epiphenomenalist analysis of  the electorate applies   to every 
parliamentary election in British history.  In this case, however,  we are dealing   not only 
with a referendum, rather than with a parliamentary election, but also with a large-scale 
scenario – the possibility of Brexit – the consequences of which may be not only profoundly 
damaging, if  not catastrophic, but also, in several respects,    irreversible. 
 
• When reﬂecting on social divisions (empowered versus disempowered, winners versus 
losers) and on economic divisions (wealthy versus poor, employed versus unemployed), it is 
important to concede that it is widely acknowledged that, for a large number of electors, 
the Brexit vote was – and was meant to be – a protest vote. ‘Ironically many of those who 
voted Brexit will bear the worst costs of economic decline and ﬁnancial crisis and in the 
end the elites  win.’20 
• When reﬂecting on educational divisions (highly educated versus poorly educated, uni- 
versity-educated versus non-university-educated) and on professional divisions (white- or 
pink-collar workers versus blue-collar workers, tertiary-sector workers versus primary- 
and secondary-sector workers), it is important to account for the fact that, for a large 
number of electors, the Brexit vote was based on misinformation and deception. Ironically, many 
of those who voted Brexit were those who lacked accurate information on what it 
actually meant in terms of its far-reaching consequences.21 
• When reﬂecting on generational divisions (young versus old, 18–44- year-olds versus 45– 65-
plus-year-olds), it is important to note that the age group that voted overwhelmingly in 
favour of Leave – that is, the 45–65-plus-year-old electors – is constituted by those British 
citizens whose future will be affected by the Brexit vote for the shortest time span, 
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whereas the age group that voted overwhelmingly in favour of Remain – that is, the 18–
44-year-old electors – is constituted by those British citizens whose future will be affected 
by the Brexit vote for the longest time span. Ironically, the majority of the 45– 65-plus-year-
old voters decided over  the long-term future – and against the will – of   the majority of  
the 18–44-year-old  voters. 
• When reﬂecting on geographic divisions (urban versus rural, Scotland/Northern Ireland 
versus England/Wales, South-East/North-West England versus North-East/South- West 
England), it is important to face up to the intricacy permeating the Brexit-vote situation: 
if the UK were to go ahead with Brexit, the two ‘home nations’ that voted in favour of 
Leave – that is, England and Wales – would drag those two ‘home nations’  that voted in 
favour of Remain – Scotland and Northern Ireland – into a future that, while it might be 
desired by the majority of the former’s electorate, was not desired by the majority of the 
latter’s electorate. Ironically, what was, in the eyes of the Brexiteers, meant to be a collective 
political act oriented towards the re-establishment of ‘national’ sovereignty, independence 
and autonomy, and thus towards the strengthening of the  UK’s position on the world 
stage, might turn out to be a divisive political act resulting  in national break-up – and, hence, 
not only in the weakening of the UK’s position on the world stage, but also in its 
dissolution or at least its shrinking to ‘an ever smaller union’ between  England  and Wales. 
• When reﬂecting on political divisions (centre-left/centre-right versus radical right, 
progressive versus conservative, Labour/Liberals/Greens versus UKIP/right-wing 
Conservatives, ‘Modern Conservatives’ versus ‘Traditional Conservatives’), it is impor- 
tant not to underestimate the long-term consequences of the Brexit vote on the UK par- 
liamentary system. What was meant to be little more than Cameron’s attempt to resolve an 
internal conﬂict in the Conservative Party turned out to lead to the most severe con- 
stitutional crisis in modern British history. Ironically, the Eurosceptic and Europhobic 
supporters of the right wing of the Conservative Party and those of UKIP – who, over- 
all, represent a relatively small minority at Westminster – were given the opportunity     to 
mobilize ill-informed preconceptions, prejudices and resentments about the EU, to such 
an extent that pro-European and Europhile Members of Parliament (MPs) – who, overall, represent a 
considerable majority at Westminster (modern/moderate Conservative MPs, most Labour 
MPs and literally all Liberal MPs) – are forced into a situation in which they have to 
implement, and to legitimize, a political project that they did not support   in the ﬁrst 
place and in which the only room for manoeuvre appears to be the option    of      
translating ‘hard Brexit’ into ‘soft Brexit’, rather than into ‘no Brexit’ at all.22 
• When reﬂecting on ideological divisions (cosmopolitan/globalist versus parochial/ 
nationalist, modernist versus traditionalist), it is important to spell out that, no matter how 
hard most Brexiteers – and so-called reluctant Bremainers – try to reassure both UK 
citizens and the international community that Brexit is not about taking the UK  out of 
Europe but only about liberating it from the alleged chains of the EU, it does represent a 
major paradigm shift from a cosmopolitan and outward-looking United Kingdom to an 
increasingly parochial and inward-looking Divided Kingdom, reduced to an alliance of 
‘Little England’ and ‘Little Wales’, whose future may be shaped by the hegemony  of   
neoliberal  austerity,  law-and-order  and  anti-immigration  policies. Ironically, 
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the imaginary of ‘an even greater (and more British) Great Britain’ may translate  into 
the reality of ‘an even smaller (and more English) Small Britain’. 
• When  reﬂecting  on  cultural  divisions  (multicultural  versus  monocultural,  outward- 
looking versus inward-looking), it is important to highlight that the UK has always   been, 
and will always remain, a multicultural society. As such, it is made up not only    of  four 
‘home nations’ – that is, England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland –     but also of  
inhabitants  with  diverse  cultural  backgrounds  from  different  parts  of the world. In 
fact, ever since it came into existence, ‘there has been no independent  Britain, no “Island 
nation” ’23 – at least not in the strict sense of an economically self-sufficient, politically 
disconnected and culturally  homogenous  entity.  Ironically, the Brexit campaign gave 
the misleading impression that a Brexit vote would pave      the way for the  construction  
of  an  independent  Brexitania,  whose  citizens’  identity would be based on a 
monoculturally deﬁned sense of  pure, pristine and patriotic Britishness, thereby 
repudiating its multiculturally constituted constitution and socially  eclectic  heritage. 
• When reﬂecting on ethnic divisions (non-white British versus white British, multilingual 
versus monolingual), it is important to point out that the UK has always been, and will 
always remain, a multi-ethnic society. In the run-up to the 2014 referendum, ‘the most 
visceral attacks’24  launched by  the Brexit campaigners ‘came in relation to a sense of  that 
national community having been betrayed by  a metropolitan elite that appeared     to care 
more for the situation of “non-British” others than it did for the “legitimate” citizens of 
Britain’.25 Ironically, the rise of discursive (and, in some cases, physical) assaults on ethnic 
minorities before and after the Brexit vote is not primarily an expression of the divisions 
between the UK and the EU but, above all, a manifestation of the ethnic – and, on many 
levels, racialized – divisions within British society itself.26 
• When reﬂecting on religious divisions (Muslim versus Christian, Catholic versus 
Anglican/Protestant), it is important to stress that, according to most statistics available 
on this matter27, the religious groups that, for the right or the wrong reasons, are often 
perceived as ‘backward-looking’, namely Catholics and Muslims, voted overwhelmingly 
in favour of Remain, whereas the religious groups that, for the right or the wrong rea- 
sons, are frequently perceived as ‘forward-looking’, namely Anglicans and Protestants, 
tended to vote in favour of Leave.28 Ironically, then, the parameters of ‘regressive’ and 
‘progressive’ appear to have been turned upside down by the motivational infrastruc- 
ture of religious electors casting their votes at the 2016 UK Referendum. 
• When reﬂecting on attitudinal divisions (Remain perspective: prudent versus imprudent, status-
quo-affirmative versus status-quo-resentful, risk-averse versus risk-taking; Leave perspective: 
boring versus exciting, lacklustre versus inspiring, unimaginative versus imaginative; 
Remain perspective: pessimistic versus optimistic, negative versus positive, past-oriented 
versus future-oriented; Leave perspective: optimistic versus pessimistic, positive versus 
negative, future-oriented versus past-oriented), it is important to remark   that, in a 
somewhat stereotypical way, the two camps were caricatured by each other on the basis of  
diametrically opposed  mindsets. 
– According to the Bremainers, the Leave campaign was imprudent, status-quo-resentful 
and unnecessarily risk-taking. 
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– According to the Brexiteers, the Remain campaign was boring, lacklustre and 
unimaginative. 
• On some levels, both campaigns accused one another of very similar, if not the same, 
limitations, but they did so for diametrically opposed reasons. 
– According to the Bremainers, the Leave campaign was pessimistic, negative and 
past-oriented: it painted a misleadingly bleak – and, arguably, distorted – picture  of 
the UK’s annual ﬁnancial contribution to the EU as well as of the EU-based 
immigrants freely moving to the UK, and it mobilized a nostalgic collective imagi- 
nary promising the restoration of national sovereignty, comparable to the era of the 
British Empire, in a post-Brexit reality. 
– According to the Brexiteers, the Remain campaign was pessimistic, negative and 
past-oriented: it painted a misleadingly bleak – and, arguably, distorted – picture of 
the UK’s life outside the EU, underestimating its ability to govern itself and to break 
out of the straitjacket of the EU’s bureaucracy and lack of  accountability as well 
as to challenge the EU’s structural incapacity to deal with, let alone to prevent,  the 
ﬁnancial and the migration crises. In their view, Brexit is, above all, about the UK’s 
right to reconvert itself into the protagonist of its own future. 
– From the point of  view of  the Bremainers, the Brexiteers overstated the  advantages 
and understated the disadvantages of leaving the EU. 
– From the point of view of the Brexiteers, the Bremainers overstated the advantages and 
understated the disadvantages of staying in the EU. 
• Ironically, then, Bremainers and Brexiteers accused one another of very similar – if 
not nominally equivalent – limitations, but when doing so they made their respective 
cases on the basis of diametrically opposed reasons. 
 
V. Prospects 
The primary aim of  the following reﬂections is to make some tentative remarks on        the 
prospects of  different Brexit scenarios – not only in relation to the UK, but also        in 
relation to the EU in particular and the wider international community in general.     One 
may speculate about what exactly is going to happen in the UK over the next few months, 
years and decades. As illustrated in the preceding sections, the UK is a country characterized 
by profound divisions – notably, by social, educational, generational, geographic, political, 
ideological, cultural, ethnic, religious and attitudinal divisions. Paradoxically, these divisions 
make it both relatively easy and relatively difficult to formulate hypotheses about future  
developments. 
 
• On the one hand, it does not take a genius to predict that these divisions – owing to their 
deep, multilayered and far-reaching constitution – are unlikely to disappear any time soon. If 
anything, the degree of their signiﬁcance and intensity will increase, meaning  that – both 
within and outside the EU, both in the short term and in the long term – the governability 
of the UK will be highly complex and the country’s overall development,  as a society, will 
suffer from a lack of cross-sectional unity and cohesion. 
• On the other hand, we have to accept that it is far from certain how exactly these divisions – 
which are tension-laden, contradictory and potentially destructive at many levels – will 
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evolve and how precisely they will manifest themselves in political trends and developments of the future. 
It sounds like a cliché, but, faced with the numerous variables shaping the current situation in 
the UK, the only real certainty is the presence of a profound sense of uncertainty. 
 
Despite the seriousness of the limbo in which the UK ﬁnds itself in the aftermath of 
the 2016 Referendum, it is possible to identify – broadly speaking – six scenarios, some of 
which are more likely, and some of which are less likely, to emerge within the near future. 
 
Scenario 1: ‘Straight Hard Brexit’ 
The ﬁrst possibility is the ‘straight hard Brexit’ scenario. In this scenario, Article 50 will be 
triggered in early or mid-2017, the negotiations between the UK and the EU about the 
details of Brexit will commence and last for approximately two years, and by the end of 2019 
the UK will have completely withdrawn from the EU,  without being a member of  the EEA 
and without continuing to subscribe to the ‘Four Freedoms’ principle. This scenario would 
do justice to the slogans ‘out means out’ and ‘Brexit means Brexit’. 
 
Scenario 2: ‘Straight Soft Brexit’ 
The second possibility is the ‘straight soft Brexit’ scenario. In this scenario, Article 50 will be 
triggered in early or mid-2017, the negotiations between the UK and the EU about the 
details of  Brexit will commence and last for two to three years, and by  2019/2020 the  UK 
will have formally withdrawn from the EU, but it will remain a member of the EEA and will 
effectively continue to subscribe to the ‘Four Freedoms’ principle. In formal terms, the UK 
will cease to be a member of the EU; in practical terms, however, it will continue to have 
access to the European Single Market, paying a heavy price for this privilege, in addition to 
not being able to sit at the EU decision-making table. 
 
Scenario 3: ‘Relegitimized Hard Brexit’ 
The third possibility is the ‘relegitimized hard Brexit’ scenario. In this scenario, Article 50 will be 
triggered in early or mid-2017, the negotiations between the UK and the EU about    the 
details of  Brexit will commence and last for two to three years, by  2019/2020 the   UK 
government – after having presented the main aspects of the proposed deal with the EU 
(which will consist in the UK formally withdrawing from both the EU and the EEA) to the 
general public – will call a general election and/or hold a referendum, and – with the 
democratic mandate of a newly elected Leave government and/or a Leave referendum result 
– the UK will officially accept the deal on offer and, consequently, cease to be a member 
not only of  the EU but also of  the EEA. 
 
Scenario 4: ‘Relegitimized Soft Brexit’ 
The fourth possibility is the ‘relegitimized soft Brexit’ scenario. In this scenario, Article 50 will be 
triggered in early or mid-2017, the negotiations between the UK and the EU about 
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the details of Brexit will commence and last for two to three years, by 2019/2020 the 
UK government – after having presented the main aspects of the proposed deal with the 
EU (which will consist in the UK formally withdrawing from the EU, but maintaining 
its EEA membership) to the general public – will call a general election and/or hold a 
referendum, and – with the democratic mandate of a newly elected Leave government 
and/or a Leave referendum result – the UK will officially accept the deal on offer and 
continue to be a member of the EEA, but cease to be a member of the EU. 
 
Scenario 5: ‘Autocratic No Brexit’ 
The ﬁfth possibility is the ‘autocratic no Brexit’ scenario. In this scenario, Article 50 will be 
triggered in early or mid-2017, the negotiations between the UK and the EU about the 
details of  Brexit will commence and last for two to three years, and by  2019/2020 the  UK 
government, without holding another referendum and before calling another election, will 
officially reject the deal on offer and decide to remain a member of     the EU. 
 
Scenario 6: ‘Legitimized No Brexit’ 
The sixth possibility is the ‘legitimized no Brexit’ scenario. In this scenario, Article 50 will be 
triggered in early or mid-2017, the negotiations between the UK and the EU about    the 
details of  Brexit will commence and last for two to three years, by  2019/2020 the   UK 
government – after having presented the main aspects of  the proposed deal with    the EU 
(which will consist in the UK formally withdrawing from both the EU and the EEA) to the 
general public – will call a general election and/or hold a referendum,        and – with the 
democratic mandate of a newly elected Remain government and/or a Remain referendum 
result – the UK will officially reject the deal on offer and remain a member of  the EU. 
 
 
*** *** *** 
 
 
What is the likelihood of one of these scenarios becoming reality? Arguably, there are strong 
reasons to believe that a realistic predictive assessment – in the order from ‘least likely’ to ‘most 
likely’ – looks roughly as follows: 
 
Scenario 5: ‘Autocratic No Brexit’ 
The ‘autocratic no Brexit’ scenario is the least likely scenario, not only because it would be difficult 
to sell to the British electorate, but also because it would be difficult to sell to    the 
international community,  including the EU.  It would deprive the UK government of both 
internal and external legitimacy. Although it would prevent both the UK’s withdrawal from 
the EU and the break-up of the four-nation state from happening, it would be extremely 
damaging to the country’s future. 
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Scenario 1: ‘Straight Hard Brexit’ 
The ‘straight hard Brexit’ scenario is the second-least likely scenario, not only because it would be 
difficult to sell to the British public, but also because it would simply not be in the long- 
term interest of the UK to ﬁnd itself not only outside the EU but also outside the EEA and, 
thus, detached from the European Single Market, with which its economy is deeply 
entangled and upon which it is profoundly   dependent. 
 
 
Scenario 3: ‘Relegitimized Hard Brexit’ 
The ‘relegitimized hard Brexit’ scenario is the third-least likely scenario, not only because leaving both the 
EU and the EEA would be almost tantamount to political and economic suicide, but also 
because this radical Leave option would be unlikely to obtain a democratic mandate on the 
basis of  a newly elected government and/or another referendum. Still, a ‘relegitimized hard 
Brexit’ scenario is slightly more likely than a ‘straight    hard Brexit’ scenario, because even 
a  Conservative  government  will  do  everything  it can (including holding an election 
and/or another referendum) to avoid any kind of    ‘hard Brexit’ scenario, given that leaving 
both the EU and the EEA is not in the UK’s strategic  interest. 
 
 
Scenario 2: ‘Straight Soft Brexit’ 
The ‘straight soft Brexit’ scenario is the third-most likely scenario, not only because it would minimize 
the disadvantages of leaving the EU by maximizing the advantages of remaining in the EEA, 
but also because this option would allow the current government to ‘get on with the job’ 
without having to obtain another democratic mandate on the basis of an additional  election  
and/or referendum. 
 
 
Scenario 4: ‘Relegitimized Soft Brexit’ 
The ‘relegitimized soft Brexit’ scenario is the joint most likely scenario, not only because it would minimize 
the disadvantages of leaving the EU by maximizing the advantages of remaining in the EEA, 
but also because this option could reasonably ﬁnd public support on the basis of  a general 
election and/or  another  referendum. 
 
 
Scenario 6: ‘Legitimized No Brexit’ 
The ‘legitimized no Brexit’ scenario is the other joint most likely scenario, not only because it would 
permit the UK to enjoy the advantages of remaining in both the EU and the EEA, but also 
because, on the basis of another general election and/or another referendum, it would 
bestow the government with sufficient political legitimacy to keep the  UK in the  EU. 
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Wishful Thinking? 
Those of us who harbour the hope that the Brexit referendum result was just a bad dream 
tend to suggest that the ‘legitimized no Brexit’ scenario may well become reality. Granted, wishful 
thinking can be the source – or, indeed, the product – of fallacious reasoning, but there are 
strong grounds for the view that the ‘legitimized no Brexit’ scenario is not an impossible 
scenario – far from it. It is difficult to know what is currently going on ‘behind the scenes’ 
of the Westminster establishment and what kind of short-term and long-term strategies are 
really being adopted by the government’s key players. It seems to me that, for the reasons 
outlined above, the current UK administration is likely to be preparing  (and aiming) for one 
of the following three scenarios: ‘straight soft Brexit’ (scenario 2), ‘relegitimized soft Brexit’ (scenario 4) 
and/or ‘legitimized no Brexit’ (scenario 6). None of these scenarios is ideal, and all of them (including 
the ‘autocratic no Brexit’ and ‘hard Brexit’ scenarios)  are fraught with difficulties. It is 
probable, however, that the only way in which the UK  can guarantee that, in the long run, 
it will survive both as a strong player (in Europe in particular and on the world stage in 
general) and as a united player (representing not only England and Wales but also Scotland 
and Northern Ireland) will be by ensuring that  Brexit does not become a real reality. Even 
the softest and most (re-)legitimized forms of Brexit will involve the substantial risk of 
triggering the break-up of the UK – a price that no UK government is likely to be willing to   
pay. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to contribute to a critical understanding of the concept of 
Brexit. It has done so by addressing a number of key issues, all of which are crucial to a 
comprehensive analysis of Brexit – notably, with regard to its meaning, its historical 
conditioning, its sociological implications, its wider legitimacy (or lack thereof) and the 
different scenarios in which it may (or may not) be implemented. 
The ﬁrst part has provided a shorthand deﬁnition of the concept of Brexit, stating that, 
in essence, it refers to the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. As explained above, advo- 
cates and opponents of Brexit tend to agree that, if Brexit is implemented by the UK 
government, its multiple consequences are of major historical signiﬁcance – not only for the 
country itself, but also for the EU and, arguably, for the entire world. 
The second part has reﬂected on the historical context in which, on 23 June 2016,   the 
UK referendum on EU membership took place, arguing that the former had a profound 
impact on the latter’s outcome. In this respect, the conjunction of  three   phenomena 
– which have contributed to the triumph of the Leave campaign – are especially impor- 
tant: a world problem, a European or EU problem and a British problem. These problems are indicative 
of the prevalent disillusionment with and alienation from mainstream political structures, 
practices and actors at the global, continental and national levels. Arguably, these are not 
limited to the UK. In fact, the Brexit scenario may be succeeded by further national exits 
from the EU – a domino-effect situation that the EU will seek to avoid at all cost and that, 
although it may seem unlikely to occur, cannot be ruled out. 
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The third part has shed light on the various sociological implications of the result of the 
2016 UK Referendum, paying particular attention to the principal reasons that led      to the 
triumph of the Leave campaign over the Remain campaign. As illustrated above, numerous 
divisions that exist in contemporary Britain appear to have shaped the outcome of the 
referendum in a decisive manner. In this respect, the following types of division are 
particularly signiﬁcant: (1) social, (2) economic, (3) educational, (4) professional, 
(5) generational, (6) geographic, (7) political, (8) ideological, (9) cultural, (10) ethnic,  
(11) religious and (12) attitudinal. As stressed in the preceding inquiry, all ﬁgures used in 
support of this division-focused interpretation of the Brexit vote need to be treated with 
caution. It would be erroneous to rely on reductionist explanations as to why particular 
sectors of the UK population voted one way or another – not least because, with the 
exception of the geographic distribution of the Brexit vote, the validity of most of the division-
focused data is extremely difficult to verify. Determinist explanations of voting patterns can 
hardly be illuminating when trying to explore why particular sectors of the electorate voted 
one way or another. Different citizens vote differently not only for many different reasons but also because they themselves, 
as individual electors, may be motivated by a variety of reasons and inﬂuenced by a variety of factors, irrespective of whether or not 
these fall into division-speciﬁc patterns. It is nonetheless crucial to recognize that these divisions 
substantially affected the outcome of the referendum, indicating the extent to which UK 
citizens’ attitudes towards the EU in particular and towards Europe in general are profoundly 
shaped by the positions that they occupy within British society. There is no point in speculating 
about the future of  a Brexit (or,  indeed, a non-Brexit) scenario if  we, as critical sociologists, 
fail      to grapple with both the causes and the consequences of  these numerous, and 
arguably profound, divisions. When making assumptions about prospective developments 
in the UK, however, it is imperative not to underestimate the complexity permeating the 
conﬂuence of, and tensions between, central issues and interests that are at stake in the 
gradual consolidation of  speciﬁc Brexit scenarios. Whatever may,  or may not, happen at 
the governmental level cannot be dissociated from what may,  or may not, happen at the 
societal level. It remains to be seen what life in the UK after (or, possibly, without) Brexit 
will look like. 
The fourth part has offered some critical reﬂections on the legitimacy – or, as some may 
argue, illegitimacy – of the 2016 UK Referendum’s outcome. From a historical perspective, 
it is difficult to understate, let alone to overlook, the fact that the result of the 2016 UK 
Referendum has triggered one of the most serious political crises in Europe since the end 
of World War II. Thus, it does not come as a surprise that, in contemporary public discourse, 
the term ‘uncertainty’ is widely employed to describe the post-referendum situation in the 
UK. The post-referendum scenario constitutes a historical context characterized by an 
enormous – and, in many ways, unprecedented – degree of social, political and economic 
uncertainty. From the point of view of the British government, this unparalleled state of  
affairs will – in the best-case scenario – lead to the temporary weakening  of the UK’s position 
in Europe or – in the worst-case scenario – result not only in the decline of the UK’s inﬂuence 
on the world stage but also in its break-up. Notwithstanding one’s assessment of the different 
possible post-Brexit scenarios, an important question  that needs to be addressed concerns 
the very legitimacy – or,  as some may conclude, 
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illegitimacy – of the 2016 UK Referendum’s outcome. As elucidated above, there are 
several key considerations on the basis of which the legitimacy of this referendum can 
– or, perhaps, must – be called into question, notably the following: 
 
1. Large proportions of  the electorate were misled by the Leave  campaign. 
2. The binary electoral choice between Remain and Leave was unjustiﬁably simplistic, 
taking into account both the magnitude and the complexity of the issues at stake. 
3. The electoral choice between Remain and Leave was unduly, as well as deceptively, 
polarizing – that is, it was not only procedurally inadequate but also politically 
treacherous. 
4. In the UK, where the Westminster Parliament possesses sovereign decision-making 
power, referenda are consultative, rather than decisive. 
5. Unlike countries in which referenda are common practice, the UK does not have any 
clear, detailed and explicit rules and regulations about the decision-making power of 
referenda. 
6. Constitutional democracies must have rules and regulations in place that prevent 
the misuse of referenda as mere instruments to push through normative agendas 
that, if implemented, have vast social, political and economic consequences – espe- 
cially if these, at least in the medium term, are irreversible. 
7. In light of the numerous and profound divisions that substantially inﬂuenced the 
outcome of  the 2016 UK Referendum, we are confronted with a number of  ironies 
– or, rather, harsh realities – that undermine its legitimacy. Those who least wanted to 
trigger, and/or least deserved to be affected by, the potentially harsh consequences of 
Brexit are those who may be hit hardest by the long-term effects of its implementation. 
 
The ﬁfth part has made some tentative remarks on the prospects of  the Brexit scenario –  not 
only in relation to the UK, but also in relation to the EU in particular and the wider 
international community in general. As argued in this chapter, the numerous and profound 
divisions that exist in contemporary British society will be crucial to the unfolding of any future 
scenario. More speciﬁcally, the chapter has maintained that it is possible to identify six scenarios, 
some of which are more likely, and some of which are less likely, to unfold within the near future: 
(1) ‘straight hard Brexit’, (2) ‘straight soft Brexit’, (3) ‘relegitimized hard Brexit’, 
(4) ‘relegitimized soft Brexit’, (5) ‘autocratic no Brexit’ and (6) ‘legitimized no Brexit’. The 
chapter has argued that the options ‘autocratic no Brexit’, ‘straight hard Brexit’ and ‘relegiti- 
mized hard Brexit’ are the least likely scenarios to become reality – mainly because of their 
immensely damaging long-term consequences. In addition, the chapter has maintained that 
‘straight soft Brexit’, ‘relegitimized soft Brexit’ and ‘legitimized no Brexit’ are the most likely 
scenarios to become reality – essentially because of their capacity to minimize the damage 
caused by the Brexit vote, while avoiding its most detrimental long-term consequences. 
It must be emphasized, however, that none of the ‘most likely’ scenarios can be 
regarded as ideal and that, furthermore, all of them (including the ‘least likely’ scenar- 
ios) are fraught with difficulties. Before the Brexit vote, it did not enter many intellectu- 
als’ minds ‘that populism would defeat capitalism in its country of  origin’29 and    that, 
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eventually, ‘identity questions would prevail against interests’30. After the Brexit vote, 
however, it has become abundantly clear that, for large proportions of the population 
living in the UK, life outside the EU may be even more ‘solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short’31 than it already was before. The prospect of more neoliberal austerity, more law- 
and-order policy and more anti-immigration sentiment (and strategy) in an even more 
isolated United (or, possibly, Divided) Kingdom does not sound like a future to which 
progressive forces, broadly deﬁned, will be looking forward. 
Whatever may (or may not) happen in (and with) the UK’s short-term and long-term 
future, however, the pursuit of a ‘critical sociology of Brexit’ will be vital. Such a collective 
undertaking is crucial not only for assessing and, if  possible, inﬂuencing the impact   of 
Brexit on academic life, but also, more importantly, for ensuring that social scientists, 
irrespective of  their disciplinary identity,  play a constructive role in shaping society for   the 
better, even – or, perhaps, especially – if history does not appear to be on their side  and 
prospects are, on balance, dire. The ﬁrst step towards realizing such an ambitious endeavour 
is to recognize that it is, above all, the divisions within European societies, rather than those 
between them, to which we need to face up before taking on the challenging task of  building 
a worthwhile  future. 
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